轉移可用數量的 ETH 時恢復錯誤

我正在嘗試編寫獎勵池分配系統，但我無法執行以下操作（按此順序）。

• A存款X金額（user_deposit）
• B存款Y金額（user_deposit）
• C 存款 Z 獎勵金額（depositRewards）

（順序在以下 2 個步驟中無關緊要）

• A 退出
• B 退出

第二次取款總是失敗並出現以下錯誤：交易已恢復到初始狀態。注意：如果您發送值並且您發送的值應該小於您目前的餘額，則呼叫的函式應該是應付的。

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

contract ETHPool {

mapping(address => bool) internal team_members;
uint256 public poolValue;
uint256 internal rewards;
address internal contractAdmin;
uint256 public rewards_timestamp;
uint256 public claimable_rewards;

struct User_Transactions {
   uint256 amount;
   uint256 deposit_timestamp;
}

mapping(address => User_Transactions[]) internal deposits;

constructor() {
   contractAdmin = msg.sender;
}

function update_team(address _memberAddress, bool _isAllowed) public {
   require(msg.sender == contractAdmin, "Function only callable by contract admin.");
   team_members[_memberAddress] = _isAllowed;
}

function depositRewards() public payable {
   require(team_members[msg.sender] == true, "Only team members are allowed to deposit rewards");
   rewards += msg.value;
   claimable_rewards += msg.value;
   rewards_timestamp = block.timestamp; 
}

function user_deposit() public payable {
   deposits[msg.sender].push(User_Transactions(msg.value, block.timestamp));
   poolValue += msg.value;
}

function withdraw() public {

   require(deposits[msg.sender].length > 0, "You have no deposits on your behalf.");
   uint256 valueAddedUntilNow;
   uint256 totalValueAdded;

   for (uint i=0; i < deposits[msg.sender].length; i++) {
       if (deposits[msg.sender][i].deposit_timestamp < rewards_timestamp) {
           valueAddedUntilNow += deposits[msg.sender][i].amount;                
       }
       totalValueAdded += deposits[msg.sender][i].amount;
   }

   uint256 share_of_pool = (valueAddedUntilNow * 100) / poolValue;
   payable(msg.sender).transfer((rewards / 100) * share_of_pool + valueAddedUntilNow); 
   claimable_rewards -= (rewards / 100) * share_of_pool;
   poolValue -= valueAddedUntilNow;
   delete deposits[msg.sender];
}
}

當你執行A withdraws你減少poolValue。然後，當您根據這個新B withdraws的執行和計算時，它將導致民意調查份額為. 這將導致應該添加到應該轉移的金額上的獎勵等於，但此時我們不再擁有所有可用的，作為 A 已經要求的一部分。share_of_pool``poolValue``100``rewards``rewards

引用自：https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/questions/116993